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Abstract—RF-powered backscatter communication is a promis-
ing new technology that can be deployed for battery-free ap-
plications such as internet of things (IoT) and wireless sensor
networks (WSN). However, since this kind of communication is
based on the ambient RF signals and battery-free devices, they
are vulnerable to interference and jamming. In this paper, we
model the interaction between the user and a smart interferer
in an ambient backscatter communication network as a game.
We design the utility functions of both the user and interferer
in which the backscattering time is taken into the account. The
convexity of both sub-game optimization problems is proved and
the closed-form expression for the equilibrium of the Stackelberg
game is obtained. Due to lack of information about the system
SNR and transmission strategy of the interferer, the optimal
strategy is obtained using the Q-learning algorithm in a dynamic
iterative manner. We further introduce hotbooting Q-learning
as an effective approach to expedite the convergence of the
traditional Q-learning. Simulation results show that our approach
can obtain considerable performance improvement in comparison
to random and fixed backscattering time transmission strategies
and improves the convergence speed of Q-Learning by about 31%.
Index Terms—Ambient backscatter communication, interfer-
ence avoidance, Stackelberg game, Q-learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ambient backscatter communication has been introduced
recently, which can provide the possibility of communication
between two nodes using available ambient RF signals without
using any active radio transmission [1], [2]. Thus, it can be a
promising technology for beyond 5G [3] which is low-cost and
energy efficient for battery-free applications such as internet
of things (IoT), drones [4], MIMO communication [5], [6] and
sensor networks. In such networks, the user tags can harvest
energy from the ambient signals and transmit the information
to the receiver over ambient RF carriers without using any
dedicated signals.
However, one of the drawbacks of such systems is that
they are sensitive to the interference and jamming due to poor
quality of the backscattered signal. Thus, in the presence of
the smart interferer, the user should try to choose the best
strategy for the transmission. However, in practical scenarios,
the user does not have any information about the state of the
system and smart interferer strategy. As a result, a dynamic
scenario should be considered in which the user can learn its
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transmission strategy via trial-and-error in a dynamic manner.
This paper is prompted to tackle such an issue.
In the literature, there are several papers that considered
the time allocation for the backscattering in hybrid wireless
powered systems. For instance, in [7], a game theoretic
formulation for RF-powered backscatter cognitive radio net-
works is presented in which the secondary user chooses
its backscattering time and the gateway charges the user
accordingly. In [8], the optimal time sharing in a RF-powered
backscatter cognitive radio network is investigated in order to
maximize the overall network throughput. In [9], the integration
of the ambient backscatter and a cognitive radio network is
introduced. The trade off between the harvest-then-transmit
and backscatter communication is investigated with the goal of
maximizing the overall transmission rate. Thus, backscattering
time plays a critical role in such systems.
On the other hand, game theory and Q-learning are used for
interference avoidance scenarios in the literature to design
the optimal power allocation for the players. In order to
design the utility function in ambient backscatter systems, the
backscattering and energy harvesting time should be considered
as they affect the number of transmission bits considerably. As
a result, assuming the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINR) as the utility of the players can not describe the
scenario well enough. In this paper, we define the utility of
the user and the smart interferer as the number of bits and
prove that both the user and the smart interferer sub-games
are convex optimization problems, and the best strategy of
each is obtained. Moreover, a scenario including the dynamic
interaction between the user and the smart interferer based on
ambient backscatter communication is considered, which is
not studied in the literature. In [10], the authors formulated
such an interaction as a Stackelberg game in which the players
are aware of the system parameters. However, in practice, the
optimal performance depends on the system state and jamming
parameters which are challenging for the user to accurately
estimate. Thus, a more practical scheme is needed in which
the system can learn the best strategy throughout the time.
The main contributions of the paper are as follows:
• An interference avoidance game for the ambient backscat-
ter communication is modeled, in which the user selects its
portion of time for backscattering and the smart interferer
chooses its transmission power.
• By taking the backscattering time into account, the utility
of the both the user and the smart interferer is defined
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as the number of transmitted bits. The convexity of the
optimization problems for each sub-game is proved and
the best strategy for each of them is obtained.
• Due to uncertainty of the system state and smart interferer
transmission policy, both user and the smart interferer can
deploy Q-learning algorithm in order to obtain the optimal
policy for the dynamic game.
• We adopted the hotbooting Q-learning to further improve
the learning speed of the algorithm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the system model and game formulation are presented. In
Section III, in order to achieve the optimal policy of the
proposed dynamic game, the Q-learning algorithm is discussed.
Hotbooting Q-learning is applied to the scenario to accelerate
the learning process. Section IV investigates the performance
of our scheme via simulation results, and finally Section V
concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
We consider an RF-powered backscatter network in which there
is a user in the system equipped with an RF energy harvesting
module and a backscatter circuit to harvest energy from the
available RF signal transmitted by the hybrid access point
(HAP) or backscatter the transmitted signal to the HAP. There
is a smart interferer that can learn the transmission strategy of
the user and respond accordingly during a sequence of time
slots. The smart interferer aims at decreasing the number of
backscattered bits by the user. It is assumed that the time is
divided into equal slots as n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}. The transmission
happens in a slotted manner and we assume that channel
parameters are fixed during each slot n. Let us assume the
transmission in a normalized time slot with the duration of 1.
The time portion allocated to backscatter communication at
slot n is denoted by φn and the rest of the time, i.e., 1−φn is
allocated for energy harvesting. The received RF power from
the HAP to the user in the free space can be written as follows:
PR = δPHAP
GTGRλ2HAP
(4pidHAP)2
, (1)
where PHAP is the transmit power of the HAP, δ is the energy
harvesting efficiency, GT is the antenna gain of the HAP and
GR is the antenna gain of the user, λHAP is the wavelength of
the signal transmitted from the HAP, and dHAP is the distance
between the HAP and the user tag [11]. Thus, we can derive
the total amount of harvested energy at the user in time slot n
as:
Ehn = (1− φn)PR. (2)
After energy harvesting in the first phase, the user exploits
all of the energy to send its own data to the receiver during
the backscatter time, i.e., φn. Therefore, the average transmit
power of the user at slot n is given by:
P Tn =
Ehn
φn
. (3)
Hybrid Access
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Figure 1: System model.
As a result the received SINRn at the HAP at time slot n can
be written as:
SINRn =
P Tnh|Γ0 − Γ1|2
pJng +N0
, (4)
where Γ1 and Γ0 are the reflection coefficients, N0 is
the noise power, pJn is the jamming power, while h =
GTGRλ2HAP/(4pidHAP)
2 and g = GJGTλ2J/(4pidJ)
2 are the
channel gain from the user to HAP and from the smart interferer
to HAP, respectively. Here, GJ is the antenna gain of the
smart interferer, λJ is the wavelength of the signal transmitted
from the smart interferer, and dJ is the distance from the
smart interferer to the user. In backscatter communications
systems, a two-state modulation is typically used because of its
simplicity. This can be implemented using load modulation [2].
By changing the antenna impedance, the reflection coefficient
can be shifted between the absorbing and reflecting states,
respectively. If the impedance is set for the absorbing state,
the impedance is matched and the RF signal can be absorbed.
In contrast, if the impedance is not matched, the RF signal is
backscattered and can be assumed as bit ‘1’ in the receiver.
Having the SINRn, the backscattering transmit data rate in
time slot n can be obtained as:
rBn = κW log2(1 + SINRn), (5)
where κ ∈ [0, 1] is the transmission efficiency, and W is the
channel bandwidth. Based on this, the number of transmitted
bits during the backscattering time φn in time slot n is given
by:
RBn = φnκW log2 (1 + SINRn) (6)
= φnκW log2
(
1 +
(1− φn)h|Γ0 − Γ1|2
φn(pJng +N0)
)
.
As can be seen in (6), considering the number of transmitted
bits as a part of the utility function can make the problem more
challenging due to the multiplication of the φn to the transmit
data rate.
The interactions between the smart interferer and the user can
be formulated as an interference avoidance game for ambient
backscatter communications. In the next section, the game
formulation is presented.
B. Game Formulation
The dynamic interference avoidance Stackelberg game
between the smart interferer and the user is formulated as
a game denoted by G, in which the user as the leader chooses
the portion of time for backscattering in order to improve
its utility, and the smart interferer as a follower chooses its
jamming power to reduce the utility of the user as much as
possible. The utility of the user denoted by UU depends on
the ambient backscattered number of transmitted bits and the
cost of backscattering offered by HAP as a gateway [7], which
is given by
UU (φn, p
J
n) = φnκW log2 (1 + SINRn)− Cφφn, (7)
where Cφ is the price charged by the HAP for the backscattering
time. The utility of the smart interferer denoted by UJ can be
defined as
UJ(φn, p
J
n) = −φnκW log2 (1 + SINRn)− CJpJn, (8)
where CJ is the smart interferer unit price for power trans-
mission. In the game, the user chooses its strategy in or-
der to maximize the utility given in (7), while the smart
interferer aims to maximize the utility given in (8), which
is equivalent to minimizing the backscattered number of
transmission bits by the user subject to the jamming cost.
In summary, in time slot n, the game can be formulated as
G = 〈{U, J}, {φn, pJn}, {UU , UJ}}〉, in which the user chooses
its backscattering time portion φn in each time slot, while the
smart interferer chooses its transmission power. The Stackelberg
game can be formulated as:
pJ∗n (φn) = arg max
0≤pJn≤pJ,maxn
UJ(φn, p
J
n), (9)
φ∗n = arg max
0≤φn≤1
UU (φn, p
J∗
n (φn)). (10)
In the following, the definition of the Stackelberg equilibrium is
given. Then, the equilibrium of the proposed game is obtained.
C. Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE)
In what follows, the SE of the game is obtained through
backward induction.
Definition 1. The SE of the proposed game G in time slot
n is denoted by the policy (φ∗, pJ∗n ), for which the following
conditions hold
UU (φ
∗
n, p
J∗
n ) ≥ UU (φn, pJ∗n ), ∀φn ∈ [0, 1], (11)
UJ(φ
∗
n, p
J∗
n ) ≥ UJ(φ∗n, pJn), ∀pJn,∈ [0, pJ,maxn ]. (12)
In order to find the SE of the game, we can find its sub-game
perfect Nash Equilibrium (NE). NE is defined as the point(s)
at which no player can improve its utility by changing its
strategy unilaterally, while other players’ strategy is not changed
[12], [13]. To do this, the well-known backward induction
method is employed [14], [15]. In this method, at first, given the
leader’s strategy, the best response of the follower is obtained
by solving the follower’s sub-game. Then, substituting the best
response of the follower, the best response of the leader is
obtained.
Theorem 1. Given the backscattering time φn, there exists a
unique optimal solution for the smart interferer’s sub-game,
and the best response strategy for the SE game at the smart
interferer side is given by:
pJ∗n =
√
ln (2)
√
∆n + ln (2)CJDn
2 ln (2)CJφng
(13)
where Dn = (φn − CJ)h|Γ0 − Γ1|2 − 2φnN0 and ∆n =
ln (2)C2J(φn−1)2h2|Γ0−Γ1|2+4CJφ2n (1− φn) ghκW |Γ0−
Γ1|2.
Proof. In order to investigate the concavity of the smart
interferer’s objective function, the second derivative of the
smart interferer’s utility function is obtained as:
∂2UJ(φn, p
J
n)
∂(pJn)
2
=
− (1− φn)φhκW |Γ0 − Γ1|
2(2φJngp
J
n +Bn)
ln(2)(pJng +N0)
2(φJng + Ln)
, (14)
in which Vn = (1− φJn)h|Γ0 − Γ1|2 + φnN0 and Ln = (1−
φJn)h|Γ0−Γ1|2 +2φnN0. Considering 0 ≤ φn ≤ 1, the second
derivative of the smart interferer’s utility function is negative,
i.e., ∂
2UJ (φn,p
J
n)
∂(pJn)
2 ≤ 0, which leads to concavity of the smart
interferer sub-game. As a result, given the φn, the optimal
solution for the smart interferer’s sub-game is available. By
setting the first derivative of (8) equal to zero, one can get the
following quadratic equation:
An(p
J
n)
2 +Bnp
J
n + Cn = 0, (15)
where An = ln(2)φnCJg2, Bn = 2 ln(2)φnCJN0g +
ln(2)(1−φn)gCJh|Γ0−Γ1|2, Cn = ln(2)φnCJN20 +ln(2)(1−
φn)CJh|Γ0−Γ1|2−φn(1−φn)ghκW |Γ0−Γ1|2. By solving
the quadratic equation in (15) and choosing the positive root,
one can get the optimal smart interferer’s transmission power
as in (13). It can be observed that for the given range of
0 ≤ φn ≤ 1, we can get ∆n ≥ 0 which leads to the real
solution.
Assuming the user as the leader of the game, it can obtain
its best strategy given the follower’s action using the following
Theorem.
Theorem 2. Given the smart interferer’s action, there exists
a unique optimal solution for the user’s sub-game, and the
best response strategy for the SE game at the user side can be
obtained in a numerical manner.
Proof. In order to investigate the concavity of the user’s sub-
game, the second derivative of the user’s utility function is
obtained as:
∂2UU (φn, p
J
n)
∂φ2n
= −h
2κW |Γ0 − Γ1|2
ln (2)φnH2n
, (16)
where Hn =
(
h|Γ0 − Γ1|2 − gpJn − n
)
φ−h|Γ0−Γ1|2. Based
on (16), we can conclude that ∂2UU (φn, pJn)/∂φ
2
n ≤ 0, which
indicates that the user’s utility function is concave with respect
to φn. Hence, given pJn, the optimal solution for the user’s
sub-game is available. By setting the first derivative of (7)
equal to zero, the optimal portion of backscattering time φ∗n
can be achieved by solving the following equation:
∂UU (φn, p
J
n)
∂φn
∣∣∣∣
φn=φ∗n
=
κW ln
(
h|Γ0−Γ1|2(1−φ∗n)
(gpJn+N0)φ
∗
n
+ 1
)
ln (2)
+
κW
(−h|Γ0 − Γ1|2φ∗n − h|Γ0 − Γ1|2 (1− φ∗n))
ln (2) ((gpJn +N0)φ
∗
n + h|Γ0 − Γ1|2 (1− φ∗n))
− Cφ = 0.
However, due to non-linearity of the obtained equation, the
closed form expression is not available, and the optimal solution
can be obtained numerically using well-known methods such
as Newton’s method [16].
The best responses of the both sub-games with respect
to smart interferer’s transmission power and the portion of
backscattering time depends on the distance of the the smart
interferer to the HAP, the channel states and the parameters of
the smart interferer in the time slot, which are not straightfor-
ward for the user to accurately estimate. In practice, since the
smart interferer and the user are not aware of the interference
power and channel gain, computation of the best responses
is challenging. One approach to deal with this problem is to
model their interaction as a repeated dynamic anti-jamming
transmission game and resort to learning algorithms to approach
the optimal policies [17], [18].
III. DYNAMIC INTERFERENCE AVOIDANCE GAME FOR
BACKSCATTER COMMUNICATION
In dynamic environments, optimal strategy selection depends
on the radio channel state and jamming parameters, which are
challenging for the user to accurately estimate. Thus, a more
practical scheme is needed in which the system can learn the
best strategy through the time. Here, the repeated interaction
between the user and the smart interferer can be considered as
a dynamic game, in which the user chooses its portion of time
for backscattering according to the system state and history of
the smart interferer transmission, and the smart interferer acts
based on the previous backscatter transmission information.
The user interaction in the proposed game can be considered as
a learning-based game and the user can deploy reinforcement
learning to obtain the best strategy [18], [19].
The feasible set for the backscattering time of the user is
quantized into K + 1 levels, i.e., φkn ∈ [φmaxk/K]0≤k≤K = Φ
where φmax is the maximum portion of time for backscattering.
Similarly, for the transmit power of the smart interferer, we
have pJn ∈ [pmaxm/M ]0≤m≤M , where pmaxJ is the maximum
transmit power of the smart interferer. In addition, the user
quantizes the received SINR into one of L levels as well, and
sends it back to the HAP. It is assumed that the user and the
smart interferer are intelligent agents. We consider that both the
user and the smart interferer can adopt a mixed strategy, which
can be interpreted as a probability distribution for the strategy
set of each player. Let piu and piJ denote the mixed strategy
of the user and the smart interferer, respectively. Applying
Q-Learning, such distributions can be obtained.
A. Q-Learning
The Q-learning algorithm can be used for solving the
proposed game in a repeated manner over the time. In
order to solve the game, we can deploy Q-learning without
knowing the state of the system, which is the system SINR.
The state of the system at time n can be represented as
sn = [SINRn−1l ]1≤l≤L ∈ L, where L is the set of all possible
SINR values.
Algorithm 1: Hotbooting process
1 1: α, β, γ, Q(s, p) = 0, V (s) = 0,∀s,∀ p, s0 = 0 ,
pi = 1|Φ|
2 for i = 1, 2, ..., I do
3 Generate a realization of the similar environment.
4 for n = 1, 2, ..., N do
5 Select φn ∈ Φ randomly.
6 Observe the utility Uu and the SINRn of the
system.
7 sn+1 = SINRn
8 Q∗(sn, φn)← (1− β)Q∗(sn, φn) + β(Uu(sn, φn)
9 +γV ∗(sn+1)).
10 V ∗(sn) = maxφ∈Φ Q∗(sn, φn)
The learning rate denoted by β ∈ (0, 1] represents the
weight corresponding to the current executed action, and the
discounting factor γ ∈ [0, 1] is used to encourage the user to
prefer maximizing the closer utility rather than the future ones.
The Q-function denoted by Q(s, φn) for state s and action
φn can be updated in each time slot n based on the iterative
Bellman equation given by
Q(sn, φn)← (1−β)Q(sn, φn)+β(Uu(sn, φn)+γV (sn+1)).
(17)
At each time slot n, the value function denoted by V (sn) can
be obtained by maximizing the Q-function Q(s, φn) over the
set of user actions, i.e., Φ, which is given by
V (sn) = max
φ∈Φ
Q(sn, φn). (18)
Let us denote the mixed-strategy probability with pi(s, φn)
which can be updated using the -greedy algorithm in order to
adjust the tradeoff between exploration and exploitation. The
updating rule for this probability can be written as
pi(φn = φ˜n) =
{
1− , if φ˜n = argmaxφn∈|Φ| Q(sn, φn))

|Φ|−1 , if otherwise
.
(19)
Without knowing the instantaneous state of the system, the
user can learn the best transmission strategy based on the
transmission history of the smart interferer which enables
the user to improve its long-term efficiency. The Q-learning
algorithm suffers from the slow convergence. However, the
convergence speed can be improved using the so-called
hotbooting Q-learning.
B. Hotbooting Q-Learning
Since the initial values of the Q-tables are all zeros, in order
to get the optimal policy, it wastes the time due to random
exploration [20], [21]. Thus, a hotbooting approach is proposed
in order to expedite the convergence. In this approach, the Q-
values are initialized using a training dataset which is already
collected from the realization of the same environment. In
particular, the Q-values and the mixed strategy probabilities
are initialized using Q∗ and pi∗ obtained in advance from the
realizations of the similar scenarios according to Algorithm 1.
As a result, the hotbooting Q-learning reduces the random
exploration in the beginning iterations and can speed up the
learning process and convergence. The overall Hotbooting Q-
learning algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Hotbooting Q-Learning Algorithm
1 α, β, γ, Q(s, p) = Q∗(s, p), V (s) = V ∗(s),∀s,∀ p,
pi = pi∗.
2 for n = 1, 2, ... do
3 Select φn ∈ Φ based on (19).
4 Observe the utility UU and the SINRn of the system.
5 sn+1 = SINRn.
6 Update Q(sn, φn) using (17).
7 Update V ∗(sn) using (18).
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, the performance of the proposed scheme is
evaluated via simulations. In the simulations, we assume that
both the user and the smart interferer are stationary and can
observe the communication. The high power HAP transmits the
signal at 2.1 GHz with 1 MHz bandwidth [22]. The transmit
power of the un-modulated signal is assumed as 43dBm. The
backscattering time cost and smart interferer transmit power
cost are assumed as Cφ = CJ = 0.1. The energy harvesting
efficiency, and reflection coefficients are assumed as δ = 0.5,
Γ0 = 1, and Γ1 = −1, respectively. The maximum transmit
power of the smart interferer is assumed as pmaxJ = 30 dBm. It
is further assumed Gt = Gi = 6 dBi, Gr = 1.8 dBi [23]. The
number of the actions for both the user and the smart interferer
is assumed as K = M = 10. For the benchmark, we consider
random allocation and fixed strategy selection for the user. For
the random case, the user selects its strategy randomly at each
time slot, while for the fixed strategy it considers equal time
portion for backscattering and energy harvesting. The distance
between the user and HAP is assumed as dHAP = 15m [22]
while that between the user and the smart interferer is assumed
as dJ = 20m. In the -greedy algorithm, we have assumed
 = 0.05.
As shown in Fig. 2, the utility of the user increases with time
and the Q-learning based dynamic solution can considerably
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Figure 2: Utility of the user vs. time slot to show the
convergence performance of the proposed schemes in the
dynamic game.
Table I: Simulation parameters.
Parameter Description Value
fc Carrier frequency of HAP 2.4 GHz
W Bandwidth 1 MHz
Cφ Backscattering time cost 0.1
CJ Interferer power cost 0.1
δ Energy harvesting efficiency 0.5
Γ0,Γ1 Reflection coefficients 1, -1
pmaxJ Max. interferer power 30 dBm
GT , GR, GJ Antenna gains 6dBi, 6dBi, 1.8dBi
improve the performance in comparison to the random scheme.
Moreover, the convergence speed of the algorithm can be further
improved using the hotbooting Q-learning. As shown in Fig. 2,
the convergence speed of the hotbooting Q-learning is about
31% better than that of the Q-learning algorithm. Fig. 3 shows
the average utility of the user at varying distances between
the HAP and the user. Q-Learning and hotbooting Q-Learning
perform almost the same in terms of the average convergence
value and both outperform the random and fixed schemes. The
utility decreases dramatically when the distance between the
user and HAP increases. The utility of the user versus the cost
of backscattering time is shown in Fig. 4. As can be seen, by
increasing the backscattering time cost, the utility of the user
decreases.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have formulated an interference avoidance
game for an ambient backscatter communication system in
which the user determines its portion of time for backscattering
and the smart interferer attempts to choose its jamming power
to interrupt the transmission. Due to lack of information
about the system state and the smart interferer transmission
power, the interaction between the user and the interferer is
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Figure 3: Average utility of the user vs. the distance between
the user and HAP.
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Figure 4: Average utility of the user vs. cost for backscattering
time.
modeled as a dynamic game and the optimal strategies are
obtained using both analytical results and Q-learning. In order
to expedite the convergence, we have adopted a hotbooting
Q-learning that can learn faster. Based on the simulation results,
it can be observed that the proposed approach can significantly
improve the user utility in comparison to the random and fixed
schemes. Considering other parameters of the user and the
smart interferer such as mobility and their location as variables,
the equilibrium of the game can be further optimized. However,
since the number of the variables in the Q-table get increased,
deep Q-learning can be employed to approximate the Q-table
and reduce the complexity of the learning game; this is left as
a future work.
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